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Viewing cable 06COLOMBO1047, NORWEGIANS RUNNING OUT OF STEAM, EU MONITORS TO

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Understanding cables

Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables ([browse by origin](#) to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this [WikiSource](#) article as reference.

Discussing cables

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at the paragraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags **#cablegate** and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. **#06COLOMBO1047**.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
06COLOMBO1047	2006-06-23 05:26	2011-08-30 01:44	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Colombo

Appears in these articles:

<http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article3955967.ece>

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 001047
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SUBJECT: NORWEGIANS RUNNING OUT OF STEAM, EU MONITORS TO
LEAVE IN 30 DAYS

Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead for reason 1.5 (d).

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Tigers insist monitors from EU-members states must leave, give 30-day window for transition. Future of the monitoring mission now extremely problematic, Norwegians will discuss it with other Nordics on June 28. Tigers upset about their treatment at Colombo airport while returning from Oslo, which Norwegians felt violated personal promise from President Rajapakse. Tigers warn Government to stop air and artillery attacks or face offensive action. Norwegians have no plans for future peace initiatives at this point, will concentrate on future of SLMM. Norwegians more depressed than we have ever seen them. END SUMMARY.

¶2. (C) Norwegian Ambassador Hans Brattskar briefed Co-Chair Chiefs of Mission June 22. Brattskar had been to LTTE headquarters in Kilinocchi the previous day to discuss with the Tigers the future of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), following the Tiger decision to no longer accept monitors from EU nations after the EU listed the LTTE as a terrorist organization. Brattskar said that he had argued strenuously with the Tigers to continue with the SLMM as currently constituted, with nationals from non-EU Norway and Iceland, and from EU members Sweden, Finland and Denmark. Brattskar's interlocutor, LTTE Political Head Tamilchelvan, adamantly refused, saying that the "leadership had decided."

¶3. (C) Brattskar told the Tigers this would have "immediate and dramatic consequences" for the work of the SLMM. He asked for a six month transition period. The Tigers would only agree to one month. They agreed to start that one-month clock ticking on June 28, when the SLMM contributor states will meet in Oslo.

¶4. (C) Brattskar said that the next steps would need to be discussed with the other SLMM members and the Government of Sri Lanka. As mentioned above, the Nordic countries would meet in Oslo on June 28. He impressed upon the Tigers the need to guarantee the safety and security of the monitors, and also of their local Sri Lankan employees. Brattskar said that the LTTE demand did not require amending the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA), since the relevant paragraph said only that SLMM members would be "recruited from Nordic countries." The two sides had agreed on which countries in discussions after the CFA was signed.

¶5. (C) Brattskar said the future of the SLMM is now uncertain. Norway and Iceland supply 20 of the current 57 members. A 20-member mission would simply not be able to do the job, placing the ceasefire under greater strain. Recruiting new countries acceptable to both parties to join the mission would be problematic at best. "Who would want to sign up?" in the current conditions, Brattskar asked.

¶6. (C) Brattskar also said that the LTTE was very upset about the way their team was treated at the Colombo Airport when they returned from the recent Oslo meeting. They were made to wait in the public arrival hall for several hours while they were processed through immigration and customs. Brattskar said that this was a violation of a promise that President Rajapaksa had made personally to Minister Eric Solheim, which in turn

had persuaded the Tigers to attend the Oslo
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meeting. (Note: where they refused to meet with
the Government.) It was acceptable to make the
Tigers go through normal entry procedures,
Brattskar said; what was not acceptable was to
jeopardize their security by having them standing
in the midst of a large crowd for several hours.
The GSL had also tried to back away from its
commitment to return the LTTE delegation to
Kilinochchi by helicopter, but had eventually given
in after intense Norwegian pressure. Brattskar
doubted that the Tigers would agree in the future
to travel through the airport, making the
logistics of any future meetings even more
troublesome.

17. (C) On other matters, Brattskar said that the
Tigers continue to deny that they were responsible
for the recent bus attack, but had asked him to
pass a message to the Government that if air and
artillery attacks continued, the Tigers would
"take offensive action."

18. (C) Brattskar concluded that Norway has to
continue as facilitator, but had no conclusions
for the coming months except that they have a big
problem with the SLMM. They don't see any
initiatives to pursue in the current climate.
Brattskar himself was leaving the next day for a
month's leave in Norway--the longest he had been
away from the island in his four-year stint as
Ambassador.

19. (C) COMMENT: The Norwegians or at least
Ambassador Brattskar, seem to have run out of
steam, and appear resigned to go into a passive
mode while they sort out the future of the SLMM.
This may be a short-term downturn while they
gather their breath, but we have never seen them
so negative in three years here.
LUNSTEAD